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From Rites to Realities (and Back Again):
The Spectacle of Human Rights in
The Hunger Games
William P. MacNeil*
In her 2012 Griffith University Fitzgerald Lecture, Professor Hilary
Charlesworth, a prominent Australian critical legal feminist and
international lawyer, characterised the current condition of human rights as
one of empty “ritualism” oblivious to any sort of tangible objective or
outcome. Calling for a strategy that would turn this ritualism of human
rights rhetoric into the reality of respectful and efficacious human rights
protection, Charlesworth examined at some length a new “rite of passage”
for the discourse and practice of international human rights: the travelling
spectacle of the Universal Periodic Review. The “reality,” however, that this
spectacular review process realises is one of a particularly staged and crafted
televisual type; indeed, according to this Article, the Universal Periodic
Review is a kind of assize version of Survivor, The Biggest Loser, The
Eurovision Song Contest—or better yet, the most recent pop culture
depiction of the “reality” TV programming phenomenon, Suzanne Collins’s
bestselling novel, The Hunger Games. For there, at the story line’s very
narrative centre, is a nationally broadcast “battle royal” between contestants
of the various vassal states of Panem, a dystopian North American hegemon
of the future, over that most basic of rights: to live or die. This Article will
canvass The Hunger Games’s representation of rights, as well as its critique
of that discourse, arguing that, in its climactic scene—with protagonists
Katniss and Peeta, both forfeiting the ultimate prize, survival, by
threatening to kill themselves—Collins’s novel may not only combust
Panem (and our) legality, but also construct an alternative to it, suggesting
a way out of the current impasse that, in the rite of the Universal Periodic
Review, thwarts the real-isation of human rights. That way may lie in the
hearty embrace, indeed exuberant celebration, of a “high ritualism” which,
by saying “No” to outcomes and objectives, rearranges the legal, political
* Professor William P. MacNeil (Griffith Law School, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia) is a scholar of
jurisprudence and cultural legal studies. His most recent book is NOVEL JUDGEMENTS: LEGAL
THEORY AS FICTION (2012), and he is the Series Editor for the new book series forthcoming from
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh Critical Studies in Law, Literature and the Humanities. At present,
Professor MacNeil is working on a study of the philosophy of law in horror, fantasy, and science fiction.

483

MacNeil_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

484

6/17/2015 10:47 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:483

and economic coordinates of international relations, thereby enabling the
reimagination of an(O)ther law: one where “the odds” are, indeed, in
everyone’s “favour.”
I. The Hunger Games, the Fitzgerald Lecture, and the Scene of Writing/
Righting ............................................................................................................... 484
II. The “Cascade of Words”: Glossolalia, “Rights Talk,” and the Universal
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III. Theatricalising Nomological Reality and Representation: Battle Royals,
Reality TV, and International Relations ........................................................ 487
IV. The Critique of Rights in The Hunger Games: Hilary Charlesworth As
Katniss Everdeen ............................................................................................... 490
V. Playing to Lose in the Hunger Games: Peeta and Katniss’s “Subjective
Destitution” As End Game ............................................................................. 493
VI. “What You Aspire to as Revolutionaries Is a New Master. You Will
Have One!”: Juridico-Political Lessons from The Hunger Games ............... 495
I. THE HUNGER GAMES, THE FITZGERALD LECTURE,
AND THE SCENE OF WRITING/RIGHTING
This Article arises from, and is informed by, two near synchronous scenes,
one aural, the other visual—and at both of which I was present in March of 2012.1
One was a Brisbane public lecture of the most rigorously socio-legal kind, which
detailed the emergence of a new international regulatory regime of public
accountability; the other was the Queensland premiere of an American blockbuster
film of the most fantastic type, based on a best-selling trilogy of science fiction
novels, which futuristically imagined the rise of a new system of governance of
brutally spectacular sanction. Knitting together these two different sensory—and
cognitive—events, at least for me as attendee at each, was a series of echoes and
reverberations around and about the explicit topic of the former, and the implied
or hidden agenda of the latter: namely, the discourse of rights, both in theory and

1. A third event must be noted here, at which, alas, I was not present; that was, of course, the
occasion for this Article’s debut presentation at the “‘Law As . . .’ III: Glossalalia—Creating a
Multidisciplinary Historical Jurisprudence” symposium held at the University of California, Irvine
School of Law in March of 2014. Family circumstances beyond my control prevented my attendance,
but I would like to convey my deep appreciation to Professor Christopher Tomlins of the University
of California, Berkeley School of Law for his exceptionally gracious invitation to present, and my
profound gratitude to Associate Professor Shaun McVeigh of the Melbourne Law School, University
of Melbourne, for his superb ventriloquism of this Article, as a paper, on my behalf at the symposium.
I would also like to thank the speaker whose lecture was this Article’s principal source of inspiration:
the person whom I think of—and openly nominate here—as the Katniss Everdeen of critical legal
theory, Professor Hilary Charlesworth of the College of Law, Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia. Jurist and jurisprude, academic and activist, legal theorist and law-and-litterateuse, “may the
odds be ever in [her] favour.”
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practice. I will argue that, in each—the fiction (film/novel) and the faction
(lecture)—the role and significance of rights are of overriding concern, even where
their presence is most acutely felt as an absence.
In this Article, I will track that dialectic of rights’ presence and absence, turning
in this Article’s second section to Professor Hilary Charlesworth’s superbly
executed and insightfully searching 2012 Fitzgerald Lecture, examining the efficacy
of the United Nation’s Universal Periodic Review (hereinafter UPR) as a human
rights monitor amongst its member states, transforming the ritualism of signatory
adoption into fully functioning “reality” of compliance.2 I will then link, in the third
section of this Article, this presence of rights—even as some lip service “ritual”—
with a text that is most decidedly marked by the rights’ seeming absence: the young
adult dystopia du jour, The Hunger Games, both in its outstanding cinematic3 and
literary forms.4
I contend that The Hunger Games, as a stellar example of what I have called
elsewhere lex populi,5 is engaged in a kind of unspoken dialogue with Hilary
Charlesworth, rendering her an avatar of Katniss Everdeen and Everdeen an avatar
of her. I say so because both Charlesworth and Everdeen go through the rites of
the (rights?) games in which each are situated, the two of them courageously
working through and with the certainly perplexing and often daunting rules of,
respectively, the Hunger Games and the UPR. But with this difference, for I hold
in the fourth section of this Article that, at one point in Collins’s gripping narrative,
Katniss stops playing the game—or rather, plays the game to its (il)logical
conclusion, thereby rearranging the coordinates of not only the Hunger Games but
also the social order of which it is, devastatingly, symptomatic. In so doing, I
maintain in the fifth section of this Article that The Hunger Games, as lex populi, as a
legal fiction, may very well hold out, in the fashion of what Panu Minkkinen would
call a “minor jurisprudence,”6 the prospect of a way forward for the legal faction of
the UPR: a prospect that is premised, paradoxically, on more rather than less ritual,
as well as less rather than more reality; and which, like Katniss, invites its defenders
(and detractors) to take up the challenge that is the ultimately salvific process of
2. Hilary Charlesworth, Dir., Ctr. for Int’l Governance & Justice, Tony Fitzgerald Lecture 2012:
Rights, Rituals and Ritualism: Making International Human Rights Law Work (Mar. 29, 2012). All
subsequent citations will be to the following online transcription of the lecture. Hilary Charlesworth,
2012 Lecture, GRIFFITH U., http://www.griffith.edu.au/criminology-law/school-criminology-criminaljustice/news-events/tony-fitzgerald-lecture-series-scholarship-fund/background/2012-lecture (follow
“Read transcript (PDF 367k)” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Charlesworth, 2012
Lecture].
3. THE HUNGER GAMES (Color Force 2012); see also THE HUNGER GAMES: CATCHING FIRE
(Color Force 2013).
4. SUZANNE COLLINS, T HE HUNGER GAMES (2008) [hereinafter COLLINS, HUNGER
GAMES]; see also SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES: CATCHING FIRE (2009) [hereinafter
COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE]; SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES: MOCKINGJAY (2010)
[hereinafter COLLINS, M OCKINGJAY ].
5. WILLIAM P. M ACNEIL, LEX POPULI: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POPULAR CULTURE (2007).
6. Panu Minkkinen, The Radiance of Justice: On the Minor Jurisprudence of Franz Kafka, 3 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 349, 357–59 (1994).
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Žižekian “subjective destitution,”7 prompted by Badiovian “event[-al ]” love.8 In so
doing, the UPR might very well roll out a system of equitable checks and balances,
in which the last word belongs neither to Katniss Everdeen nor to Hilary
Charlesworth but, as I conclude in the sixth section of this Article, to that unlikely
but nonetheless, by my lights, most perspicuous of legality’s critics, The Hunger
Games’s outlandish stylist, the inimitable Effie Trinket.
II. THE “CASCADE OF WORDS”: GLOSSOLALIA, “RIGHTS TALK,”
AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW
In her 2012 Brisbane-delivered and Griffith University-sponsored Fitzgerald
Lecture, “Rights, Rituals and Ritualism: Making International Human Rights
Work,” prominent critical legal feminist and international lawyer Professor Hilary
Charlesworth characterised the current state of human rights as one of empty
“ritualism.”9 According to the regulatory theory cited most fully by Charlesworth—
notably that of the Australian National University’s John Braithwaite,10 and before
him, Robert Merton11—“ritualism” is oblivious to any sort of objective or outcome,
so that, in the context of human rights law, lip service is paid by nation-states as
signatories to the ever proliferating raft of human rights instruments—treaties,
covenants, declarations, and so forth—all the while tolerating, even perpetuating,
violations, if not outright abuses.12 To that end, Charlesworth meticulously itemises
the means and modalities by which nation-states evade, nullify, and obscure the
obligations that they have undertaken by signing up to human rights’ “[c]ascade of
words”13—that is, its polyphonic, even cacophonous, juridical glossolalia of “rights
talk.” States do so, for example, by minimally amending their own domestic laws,
leaving them largely untouched by the benchmarks of the international
instruments;14 or by a perfunctory monitoring and reportage of human rights abuses
and/or their roll outs;15 and finally, by invoking claims of culture to justify, validate,
and, indeed, legitimise what would be flagrant violations of international human
rights law, especially around the hot topics of free speech, gender equity, and sexual
difference—to name a few.16 A sorry spectacle, indeed; and one in which even

7. Slavoj Žižek, Love Beyond Law: A Review of Bruce Fink’s The Lacanian Subject: Between
Language and Jouissance, 1 J. PSYCHOANALYSIS CULTURE & SOC’Y 160, 160–61 (1996).
8. See ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT 175 (Oliver Feltham trans., Continuum 2005)
(1988).
9. Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
10. JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND THE NEW
PYRAMID (2007); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS
FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER (2008).
11. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 238–41 (enlarged ed.
1968) (1949).
12. Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Australia, my adoptive country, was a participant—principally for its exemption of
religious schools from gender equity provisions, thereby joining the infamous
rogues’ gallery of Iran, Syria, Libya, and so on.17
Calling for a strategy that would turn this “ritualism” of human rights rhetoric
into the reality of respectful and efficacious human rights protection, Charlesworth
examined at some length a new rite of passage for the discourse and practice of
international human rights: the spectacle of the UPR.18 Conducted under the
auspices of the UN’s Human Rights Council and consisting of a travelling assize of
representative member states, the brief of the UPR was and is to scrutinise, every
four years, each UN member state on its humans rights record, judging them and,
if warranted, finding them wanting.19 Charlesworth hailed the UPR as a
breakthrough, not the least because it put paid to the notion, through its processes
of peer rather than expert review, that there are no essentially “good” human rightssensitive nations as well as no essentially “bad” human rights-hostile ones.20 In fact,
the underlying presumption of the UPR is this: that all nations, as signatories, aspire
to be rights oriented and, at least, have the best of intentions to act in accordance
with international norms.21 By the same token, all nations will have shortfalls, even
abuses of human rights, within their domestic system that the peer-refereeing
process will alert them to. Not that, for Charlesworth, this peer-refereeing process
was without its problems.22 While it may have levelled the playing field between the
hitherto “expert” developed world and the previously “abusive” developing world,
the UPR opened up a host of other even more considerable problems that would
plague it; for example, in those sweetheart deals between reviewers and reviewed,
the quid pro quo arrangements of which threatened to permanently stall human
rights’ movement from “ritualism” to “realism,” miring it forever in the rite of
review that, itself, becomes a type of highly staged managed and contrived
nomological “reality.”23
III. THEATRICALISING NOMOLOGICAL REALITY AND REPRESENTATION:
BATTLE ROYALS, REALITY TV, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
This theatricalisation of nomological reality that the UPR portends suggests a
moving image analogue, which is very much a media “sign of our (interesting)
times”: namely, reality television. For what is the UPR but a kind of globalised

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Universal Periodic Review, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
22. Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
23. Id.; UN: Mixed Results for New Review Process, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2008/04/18/un-mixed-results-new-review-process (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
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version of Survivor,24 Big Brother,25 or better yet, the Eurovision Song Contest,26 with all
participating states, like the contestants in the above named shows, in competition—
sometimes working against each other, sometimes collaborating with each other—
but all dedicated to securing a winner’s title for their teams and/or themselves by
mustering enough votes. This, of course, is the whole point of reality TV: what is
so real about it is that it engages us; that is, the audience, whose yeas or nays are
constantly solicited, and whose support—or lack thereof—can mean a winner’s
laurels and crown of victory, or the ignominy of defeat, being voted off the
programme or out of the house. If the reader thinks it ludicrous the comparison
being drawn here between the whimsical spectatorship of reality television—voting
with their hearts, stomach, feet, sexual organs, anything but their minds—and the
broad-based consultation carried out by the UPR, then think again. I say so because
the governments involved in this process would find such a comparison anything but
ludicrous; in fact, each behave much like studio executives, doing all they can to
cherry pick presentations and even screen, if not thwart, dissenting access to the
process. Consider the case of China, cited by Charlesworth. During its UPR, China’s
government jammed the Internet for the duration of that process,27 censoring any
possible sources of dissensus.
So here we have the shared commonalities of audience manipulation, crafted
conflict, and the rule-bound process of gamesmanship. Given that both law’s
politics (such as the UPR) and the global media (from the Biggest Loser 28 to Ladette to
Lady 29) are saturated with this kind of “reality” programming, is it any wonder that
24. Survivor (Mark Burnett Productions, May 31, 2000–present). Survivor is a phenomenally
successful U.S. reality game show, premised on the survival of one member of one or more “tribes”
left to fend—and be filmed—for themselves in remote locations, such as Borneo, the Marquesas,
Outback Queensland, and so forth. The show is based on an earlier Swedish programme. Expedition:
Robinson (Strix Television 1997–2012).
25. Big Brother (Endemol 1999–present). Big Brother is a popular reality game show that brings a
group of disparate individuals together under one roof, subjecting them to constant, 24/7 camera
surveillance, à la George Orwell’s totalitarian dystopia, Nineteen Eighty-Four. Big Brother tracks the
housemates’ emotional ups and downs, their group conflicts, and their personal amities. Big Brother’s
ultimate winner is the one contestant who survives the weekly evictions that the housemates nominate
and the TV audience decides. Devised and screened first in the Netherlands in 1999, Big Brother has
been a tremendous hit around the world, with many countries—United Kingdom, Australia, and so
on—having their own version of the series.
26. Eurovision Song Contest (European Broadcasting Union 1956–present). The granddaddy of all
televised talent contests, Eurovision Song Contest is the forerunner of such current televisual hits as Pop
Idol, The X Factor, Britain’s Got Talent, and so on. Commencing in 1956, and open to all member states
of the European Broadcasting Union, Eurovision invites each participating nation to field a “team”—a
recording artist or group—that wins by popular vote. Celebrated for its high camp entertainment value
and often unintentionally hilarious performances, Eurovision launched the careers of 1960s pop diva
Sandie Shaw, Québecoise power balladeer Celine Dion, and of course, Swedish singing sensation
ABBA.
27. Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
28. The Biggest Loser (25/7 Productions 2004–present). The Biggest Loser is an American reality
show centered around weight loss, hence, the winner being “the biggest loser.”
29. Ladette to Lady (RDF Television 2005–2010). A contemporary take on My Fair Lady, this
United Kingdom reality show takes a group of “ladettes” (raucous young women, usually of working
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one of the best-selling novels of late is Suzanne Collins’s young adult fiction, The
Hunger Games? For at the narrative centre of Collins’s novel—and its trilogy followups, Catching Fire and Mockingjay—is an elaborate televised contest between
contestants of the various states—“districts,” thirteen in number—of Panem,30 a
dystopian North American hegemon of the distant future, wantonly cruel in its
totalitarian political practices (think of the “Avoxes,” offenders who have had their
tongues ripped out,31 not to mention “the mutts”32 and other genetically engineered
abominations33) as it is emptily hedonistic in its over-the-top pleasure pursuits
(think of the bizarre body augmentations, mentioned throughout the series, where,
for example, cat’s whiskers on a human face are a fashion statement34). These two
cultural points—of cruelty and hedonism, violence and pleasure; in short,
“enjoyment” as Žižek35 and the post-Lacanians36 would put it—each come
together, aligning axially, in the series’ eponymous Hunger Games. For the stakes
are high in the Hunger Games because, as the title of the contest implies, the games
are not about national prestige or recording, acting, or modelling contracts—like
our reality shows—but rather, are about actual physical need at the most basic
bodily level; and not just about whether one is hungry or satiated, but whether one
is to live or die. This is because the winning victor of the Hunger Games not only
vanquishes his or her rivals: he or she kills them in a battle royal(e) to the death.37
I reference “battle royale” because, of course, The Hunger Games bears an
uncanny resemblance to the Japanese young adult fiction38 and cult film39 of the
class background) and turns them into “ladies” of a peculiarly dated kind—cutglass accents, Sloanranger fashions, and gentrified “county” preoccupations such as horses, gardening, Cordon Bleu cookery,
and so forth.
30. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 21.
31. Id. at 94 (exemplifying Avoxes by describing Katniss’s server in the run-up to the Games).
32. They take the form of ferocious wolves all bearing the faces of slain contestants in id. at
400–14; in COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 369–77, they take the form of enhanced and
highly aggressive monkeys; and last but certainly not least—indeed, worst for last, in COLLINS,
MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 360–67, they take the form of human-reptile hybrids who seem
hardwired to hunt down Katniss, destroying all in their way, including each other.
33. “Tracker jackers” (killer bees) and “jabberjays” (spying birds) in COLLINS, HUNGER
GAMES, supra note 4, at 51–52, 224–25, are both dangerous, if not deadly. Not all “muttations” are as
malign; for example, the “mockingjay,” itself, is one, the by-product of the unintended mating of
escaped jabberjays and mockingbirds in the wild. Id. at 52.
34. COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 60.
35. For a sustained treatment by Žižek of this concept of transgressive eros, first his political
treatment, see SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY K NOW NOT WHAT T HEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A
POLITICAL FACTOR 2–11, 30–31, 220–21, 231–41, 253–54, 271 (1991), and then, for an
aestheticisation of it, see SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM! JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD
AND OUT 143, 154, 177, 227 (1992).
36. See, e.g., RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM
AFTER THE FALL OF SOCIALISM 6, 15, 21–22, 28, 78, 85–88, 100–03, 108, 132, 141 (Teresa Brennan
ed., 1994); ALENKA ZUPANČIČ, ETHICS OF THE REAL: K ANT, LACAN 23, 30, 55–56, 80–81, 99–100,
108, 135, 155–57, 190, 201, 217, 240–42, 249–55 (2000).
37. See COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 21–22.
38. KOUSHUN TAKAMI, BATTLE ROYALE (Yuji Oniki trans., VIZ Media, LLC 2003) (1999).
39. BATTLE ROYALE (AM Associates 2000).
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same name, the story arc of which is one of a contest, indeed competition, to the
death between a group of select teenagers. Now, before any reader mutters to
themselves “rip-off,” and starts to speed-dial their favourite copyright lawyer, bear
in mind that Suzanne Collins—who has been, hitherto, scrupulous about her
sources—maintains that she was not aware of either the film or fiction.40 This claim
rings true, particularly given how quick she was to acknowledge her debt to Greek
mythology (and the Theseus legend with its tale of the sacrifice by Athens of seven
young people every seven years to the Cretan minotaur 41) and Roman politics (with
its imperium of panem et circenses, or the “bread and circuses,”42 of which the Hunger
Games are the gladiatorial equivalent of the appropriately monikered Panem).43 All
of which drives home the point that in the hermetically sealed context which Collins
inhabits—an edgy, xenophobic America, on the back foot since 9/11 and, most
definitely, in decline—is a twenty-first-century Panem, the parochial narcissism of
the latter being all too in evidence here in the former, with a best-selling novelist
who hasn’t even heard, let alone read or screened, the Asian precursor of her own
blockbuster. But, more than that, what the synchronicity of Battle Royale and The
Hunger Games suggests is that, in their shared plot lines—of fierce combat, gory
violence, and graphic death—there is most definitely something in the global
zeitgeist—American, Asian, Antipodean, and elsewhere—which is reflected by and
resonates in these tales of murderous gamesmanship, of do-or-die spiel.
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS IN THE HUNGER GAMES:
HILARY CHARLESWORTH AS KATNISS EVERDEEN
I want to suggest here that this “something,” this hitherto unnamed “x” that
these narratives not only speak to but are spoken by, are rights, themselves now
subject, in their discursive ubiquity, to the kind of overexposure beloved of the
postmodern society of spectacle, and of which the protocols of the UPR are the
most recent procedural instantiation. In light of this, one might very well find, as
fair and reasonable comment, the analogisation of that locus of high ritualism, the
UPR’s “rites of rights,” as a version of reality TV-as-international relations. But
where, you may ask, are rights in The Hunger Games? Certainly, a desperate scramble
over resources is all too in evidence; and, of course, sanctions, indeed punishment,
abound, as well as a sadistically “playful” gamesmaster, chopping and changing the
“rules of the game,” even the very level playing field of the contest’s pitch with fire,
flood, earthquake, and all manner of “muttation.”44 But rights? Rights seem to have
40. Susan Dominus, Suzanne Collins’s War Stories for Kids, N.Y.T IMES MAG., Apr. 10, 2011, at
MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/magazine/mag-10collins-t.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
41. See 1 ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK M YTHS 273–343 (Kenneth McLeish ed., The Folio
Soc’y ed. 1996) (1955).
42. Coined by Juvenal, the first century Roman critic and satirist.
43. Interview with Suzanne Collins, SCHOLASTIC BOOK CLUB, http://world.club-kids.scholastic
.co.uk/clubs.content/18832 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
44. See COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 212.
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gone on walkabout here, having been replaced by Panem’s crass, crude, and hamfistedly authoritarian power politics, with all of its distributive injustice. Consider
the Capital’s relentless drain on its tributary districts, sapping them of vital supplies:
food staples (District 1145), coal (District 1246), fisheries (District 447), manufactured
goods (District 348), and even drugs du jour (District 649). Further, recall its vengeful
culture of brutal reprisal, not just for major offenses such as “the uprising”50 some
seventy-five years before (for which the Hunger Games are the retributive
punishment51), but even for the most trivial of infractions (such as that of
“peacekeeper” Darius, one of the friendlier guards, turned into an Avox for
intervening on behalf of a set-upon Gale Hawthorne, Katniss’s love interest52). With
this ever changing array of ukases, diktats, and “orders from on high” interdicting
what had hitherto been tolerated, if not encouraged—like the “black market” of the
Hob, flourishing one day,53 ruthlessly shut down the next54—Panem is very much
of the kind of totalitarian society that Lon Fuller would decry as law-less, its legality’s
“inner morality” having gone on walkabout, permanently.55
So again, where are rights here? Surely, this is precisely the kind of rights-free
dystopia that scholar-activists such as Hilary Charlesworth would have nightmares
about: a bleak wasteland of pronouncements, where fearful obedience to the
“command of the sovereign” is rife, but where the law as liberal democracy
understands it—that is, as the rule of law, with rights at their centre—is in ruins,
much like District 12’s dilapidated courthouse, the “Justice Building,” against whose
collapsing façade the reaping takes place.56 Here Charlesworthian rights have no
place—if, that is, we are talking about Hilary Charlesworth in her current
instantiation as a staunch advocate—in fact, jurist—of rights. Then, for her, Panem
is a society evacuated of recht. But an earlier instantiation of Hilary Charlesworth—
one who, like a juridical version of Katniss Everdeen, made her name as one of the
common law world’s most forthright and courageous critics, especially feminist critics
of human rights,57 ever deconstructing a discourse which had for far too long
privileged “man” in human—that Charlesworth, the critical legal Charlesworth,58
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 245.
Id. at 244–45.
See COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 200.
See COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 264–65.
See COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 350, 375.
COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 21.
Id.
COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 135, 262.
COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 13.
COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 155–56.
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 (rev. ed. 1969).
See COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 20.
See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (Dominic McGoldrick ed. 2000); Hilary Charlesworth,
Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 379–94 (1999).
58. This is a persona not so distinct from the current Hilary Charlesworth, and in fact, is
coextensive with it. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, The Women Question in International Law, 1 ASIAN J.
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would have recognised rights by their negative presence in Collins’s fictional
representation of what Hardt and Negri might call “Empire” in futuristic fancy
dress.59 By “negative” here, I mean negative in the photographic sense of inversion,
whereby light becomes dark, and dark becomes light, the fundamental effect of
which is to throw what, until then, was unseen into bold relief, making explicit what
was implicit, outing the hidden.
That is precisely how Collins, whether consciously or more likely not, writes
right into the picture here, as inverted by critique, thereby highlighting what has
hitherto remained concealed, hived off as some dark, even dirty, secret. Take, for
example, the opening scene of the Hunger Games proper: the scramble for precious
goods—weapons, camping material, foodstuffs, water—that occurs in the mad dash
to the appropriately monikered “Cornucopia,” and its representation of the grim
slaughter that occurs along the way, a third—at least—of the contestant combatants
literally stopped dead in their tracks.60 Is not this scene of murder and mayhem a
crude literalisation of not only the crass relationship of exploitation that obtains
between Panem’s periphery and its centre—the career tributes of the prosperous
districts carting off the bulk of the goods, as they cut down their weaker rivals from
the client districts—but, even more, a restaging in highly vivid terms of “the war of
all against all” that social contract theory, from Hobbes61 to Nozick,62 has taught
was the děgrěe zěro of humanity’s “original position”? An originary position which is
prior to the imposition of the Law (i.e., the contract itself), but nonetheless, in which
all and sundry are in full possession of their rights, particularly the rights to kill and
be killed.63 This death-dealing potentiality only intensifies, as Locke drives home,
with possession, ownership—indeed property; that is, the threat to one’s things, the
product of one’s labour—cultivated land, crafted objects—prompting tension,
conflict, and open violence.64
This is exactly what happens in the Hunger Games and, especially, at the
Cornucopia: a vividly lurid violence over things that is the occasion of proprietorial
conflict, the blood-soaked aftermath of which leads to a kind of parody of the social
contract. I refer, of course, to those grotesquely strategic alliances between
individuals and groups—to which Peeta is party, at least initially, and under extreme
duress65—that are intended to inaugurate anything but the lasting peace of the social
contractarians; instead, they are designed with a definite sunset clause in mind. That
is, these contracts, so-called, are operative as long as they work to the mutual
INT’L L. 33, 33–38 (2011). All of which goes to show that one can make law—as a jurist—and be a
critic of it, at one and the same time.
59. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000).
60. See COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 185.
61. 1–3 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Noel Malcolm, ed., Clarendon Press 2012) (1651).
62. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
63. See 1–3 HOBBES, supra note 61; NOZICK, supra note 62.
64. JOHN LOCKE, T WO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 100–209 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1690).
65. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 193.
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advantage of the parties. So even as cooperative an arrangement as contract, with
all of its imperatives of mutuality and bargaining in good faith, has become, here, a
modality that is politically cynical, crassly goal oriented, and intended to be
jettisoned when no longer expedient. For the social context in which these contracts
are situated—that of the Hunger Games—is one that is ever shifting, always
uncertain, radically indeterminate, its rule system up for grabs, so much so that two
winners are allowed one day66 (facilitating the Peeta-Katniss alliance, and faux love
story67), then discontinued the next68 (provoking the “tragic choice” of one, the
other—or, as it turns out, both69). With this kaleidoscopic world of altering rule
patterns, even skewed playing fields—tranquil one moment, ablaze the next;
soldering, then sundering professed contracts—the following, perhaps inevitable,
inference arises: is this not a vision of the way in which, as a matter of praxis, a
certain form of law plays out? The law referred to here is, of course, bourgeois-liberal
legality and its aspirational ideology of the Rule of Law, with rights at its centre. For
it is precisely that nomos which is seen as woefully deficient, not just by The Hunger
Games, but also according to the critical legal studies movement, which sees in its
rule indeterminacy; in its equality, unequal advantage and disadvantage; and in its
“law of laws”—the “social contract”—nothing but politics.70 Indeed, so closely
does The Hunger Games echo, in all of its gruesome detail, a kind of lex populi critique
of law here, that sometimes I wonder if Suzanne Collins, like Hilary Charlesworth
before her, studied critical legal theory under “the greats” of that movement at
Harvard—antinomian jurisprudes such as Duncan Kennedy71 and Roberto
Unger,72 themselves all critics of rights as (re)conceived, by conventional marxisant
leftists, as a right to violence.
V. PLAYING TO LOSE IN THE HUNGER GAMES:
PEETA AND KATNISS’S “SUBJECTIVE DESTITUTION” AS END GAME
The violence of the Hunger Games, however, is more than just a stripping
back of humanity to their murderous natural right—what the Freudians might call
the death drive, ever beyond the pleasure principle.73 On the contrary, the “Games”
are very much about engaging with pleasure; specifically, the pleasure one takes in
pain—only here, that pleasure serves what might be called, superegoically, a
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 295.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 416.
Id.
See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982).
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law School As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 70, at 40, 40–64; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979).
72. See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY
(1987); see also ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
73. 18 SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD ( James B. Strachey et al. eds. & trans., The Hogarth Press 1955) (1920–
1922).
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“higher” and profoundly retributive purpose. For the real point of this bizarre
tournament is not just to give a perverse form of pleasure to the jaded spectators of
Panem, ever eager to “enjoy” in the darkest Lacanian74-Žižeckian75 sense of that
term, atrocity in all its “permut(t)ations”; rather, it is to serve as a spectacular form
of sanction, a vividly dramatic punishment to Panem’s vassals, themselves guilty of
disloyalty, having risen against the monstrously maternal Mother Country seventyfive years prior.76 This, incidentally, is precisely how that “critic of critics” Karl Marx
said that rights, contract, and the Law operated; its claims of freedom, equality, and
fair treatment looking like, when one drills down beneath the surface, a hard kernel
of punishment, a core of brute sanction.77 Evoking, with heavy irony, that “Eden
of the innate rights of man,” Marx writes of its penalising “primal scene” where
comes “[the] capitalist; [and] the possessor of labour-power [who] follows as his
labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other,
timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has
nothing to expect but—a hiding.”78 It is this punitive “hiding” that is, indeed, hiding
beneath the discourse of rights: a hiddenness that Marxist legal theory is intent on
disclosing, and which I would argue Suzanne Collins enacts, however unwittingly or
consciously—she, after all, wrote The Hunger Games with the idea of critiquing the
society of consumption.79
So sanction and violence, as well as politics and its machinations, coupled with
the desperate dash for resources—this is the mise-en-scene of The Hunger Games, its
contest-as-“battle royal” reverberating with judicial meaning, with jurisprudential
insight. Quite simply, that rights are not all that they seem and are in fact driven by
something else: economic imperatives, political strategy, and disciplinary motives.
Except when, of course, Katniss hives off these external control mechanisms—
economy, politics, and discipline—and takes matters literally into her hands with a
handful of poisonous nightlock berries and, with them, exercises her own rights in
tandem with Peeta: namely, the most autonomic of all rights, the right to terminate
one’s own life.80 Such a right-ful act is one that philosopher Slavoj Žižek would call
“subjective destitution”81—which, as here, means playing dead for and to the
Symbolic Order; not just, literally, killing yourself but, figuratively, killing the “Big
Other” by refusing to play by its rules, thereby disrupting its regime of control,
arresting its mechanisms of power, creating a space for change. This is precisely
74. JACQUES LACAN AND THE OTHER SIDE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 292 ( Justin Clemens &
Russell Grigg eds., 2006).
75. ŽIŽEK, supra note 35.
76. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 21–22.
77. 1 K ARL M ARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 172 (Frederick Engels
ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Progress Publishers, 1954) (1867).
78. Id.
79. Hannan Trierweiler Hudson, Q & A with Hunger Games Author Suzanne Collins, SCHOLASTIC,
http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/article/qa-hunger-games-author-suzanne-collins (last visited
Mar. 26, 2015).
80. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 417–18.
81. Žižek, supra note 7, at 160–61.
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what Katniss’s act does here: it interrupts the smooth operation of the Hunger
Games which, for all its blood and gore, has gone pretty much according to plan,
until, of course, now when Katniss (and Peeta) disrupt the Games’ eleventh hour
twist—that they must now “battle royal” against each other—by electing to jointly
commit suicide, thereby depriving the Games of any winner.82
VI. “WHAT YOU ASPIRE TO AS REVOLUTIONARIES
IS A NEW MASTER. YOU WILL HAVE ONE!”83:
JURIDICO-POLITICAL LESSONS FROM THE HUNGER GAMES
Snow, of course, instantly sees the possibility of revolt in this moment and its
act of defiance, and would have, as the uncrowned presidential “king” of Panem,
ordered the instant execution of each, both Katniss and Peeta.84 Executions, of
course, follow—with the efficiency of a Stalinist purge. Think of head gamemaker,
Seneca Crane, who is dispatched, summarily, for allowing—indeed not even
anticipating—this piece of bravado showmanship of Katniss and Peeta’s rights;85 a
plan of action that, by the way, can suggest a path forward for member states under
the UPR. Specifically, instead of bristling with anger like Australia did when
criticised by Iran for its poor prison conditions and gender inequity,86 that, on the
contrary, the nation take it on the chin with equanimity and hold out a hand of
solidarity—rather than a fist of retaliation, as then-shadow Foreign Minister (now
actual Foreign Minister) Julie Bishop wanted to do87—that would acknowledge,
indeed own up to, its own shortcomings and failures first, then soliciting the other
to do likewise.88 In short, Australia would take the plunge into critical reflection,
even self-negation on a collective level, and thereby experience as a nation the kind
of “subjective destitution” that Katniss and Peeta did on an individual level. Who
knows? It might actually produce change, even an insurrection, as it does in The
Hunger Games.89 For what Katniss and Peeta’s act of symbolic disruption through
subjective destitution did was open up a sluice, creating an aperture for what Alain
Badiou would call an “Event”90 of transformation, upsetting and forever
rearranging the coordinates of Panem’s Symbolic through revolutionary praxis.
Wherein lies this “Event” than in an act of pure love, which Badiou itemises
as one of the four event-inspired and inspiring “truth” procedures, the others being

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
2, 2011),
review/.
88.
89.
90.

COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 417–18.
JACQUES LACAN AND THE OTHER SIDE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 207.
COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 24.
Id.
Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
Julie Bishop, Shadow Foreign Minister, Statement on U.N. Universal Periodic Review (Mar.
available at http://juliebishop.com.au/shadow-ministerial-statement-un-universal-periodicCharlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
COLLINS, MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 12.
BADIOU, supra note 8, at 175 (defining an “eventual site”).
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art, politics, and science,91 all of which are knotted here and have their source in this
relationship of the two: the lovers. The lovers I speak of, however, are not Peeta
and Katniss—whose relationship, initially, is forced and contrived: to wit, a media
stunt.92 Love does come to them, yet quietly, slowly, inexorably—as Katniss
especially, but Peeta also, recover from their respective psychic damage, and grow
into an affectionate partnership, as the epilogue to Mockingjay, the third in the series,
tells us, living together back in District 12, raising children and content in their
middle-aged marriage of true minds.93 The love I speak of, however, is not this one
of passive contentment but, rather, that of wrenching affect, the charge of which
carries the possibility and potential to mobilise its witnesses, energising them to
action, functioning as a call to arms. That love is present in The Hunger Games,
indeed, it is vividly on display in the Katniss-Rue relationship, the latter being a
stand-in for the former’s very reason for being in the Games: as a substitute for her
younger sister, Primrose Everdeen.94 That Rue reminds Katniss so much of
Primrose is one of the key reasons that they bond in a relationship that while
working to their advantage (each saves the other95), is most definitely not strategic;
that is, not constrained and limited by the imperatives of the Hunger Games. For is
there anything less like the peculiar “ethos” of the Hunger Games—which,
ordinarily, would celebrate a foe’s death—than the highly touching, indeed loving
final scene between Rue and Katniss, the latter waking her dead friend with a
moving song (art), commemorating their sisterly alliance of shared knowledge
(science), and thereby, awakening Rue’s own district, soliciting not only sympathy
but sedition (politics).96 Is this not love as the Event?
As suggested above, this is an event which has aesthetic consequences (giving
us a auditory sign and symbol of change, the “mockingjay”97), scientific
consequences (constituting, as it does Katniss’s first real kill, initiating her into the
procedures and protocols of the Games’ laboratory of destruction98), and especially
political consequences (comprising a bold departure from the usual ruthless
triumphalism that accompanies death here, and functions as a clarion call to arms,
as much as a poignant tribute99). All of which opens up a space within the hitherto
closed Symbolic of Panem—hitherto, all strong policing and absolutist control—
for a resistance movement that will in subsequent volumes, grow into an open
rebellion and result in revolution.100 Allied with, then leading, the rebellion against
91. ALAIN BADIOU, M ANIFESTO FOR PHILOSOPHY (Norman Madarasz ed. & trans., State
Univ. of N.Y. Press 1999) (1989).
92. COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE, supra note 4, at 28.
93. COLLINS, MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 454–55.
94. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 283 (stating that Katniss sang to Rue like she
would sing to her sister and accidentally called Rue by Prim’s name).
95. Id. at 229.
96. Id. at 282–87.
97. Id. at 256–57.
98. Id. at 282 (stating that Katniss shot and killed the boy from District 1).
99. Id. at 286–87.
100. COLLINS, MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 12.
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the Capitol is the hitherto dormant District 13, an underground Sparta-like society
of collective discipline and painfully egalitarian distribution of the best command
society kind, from each, according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.101 That
District 13, and the tactics they utilise—ordering the bombing of the children
human shields Snow has conscripted to protect his White House-style presidential
mansion102—turn out to be worse than the old peacekeepers of Panem is one of
the bitter ironies of The Hunger Games, its representation here touching upon the
political insight adumbrated by Lacan that revolutions often end up reproducing, in
new and unusual forms, the very injustices that they decried—and were intent on
rectifying—in the first place by the (re)installation of mastery: “What you aspire to
as revolutionaries is a master,” he responds to the rioting soixante-huitards, “You will
get one!”103 This is precisely what Katniss-as-revolutionary targets when she coldly
and clinically directs her arrow away from ex-President Snow, scheduled to be
executed, and instead shockingly assassinates President-elect Alma Coin, the leader
of District 13, shooting her dead.104
Why? Because in addition to having killed Primrose, Coin is intending to
reinstall the Hunger Games, only this time its contestants will be drawn from
Panem’s most prominent families, as a reprisal against the conquered imperial
city.105 This truly Byzantine form of payback is one which Katniss, paradoxically,
votes for initially, but then, inadvertently, thwarts by staging her own act of vengeance
against Coin.106 This act is, for all its psychotic passage à l’acte,107 fortuitous: the right
act for the wrong reason, because it calls to a halt the seemingly endless spiral of
violence—with the unending call and response of “you have violated my rights, I
want restitution”; “no, you have violated my rights, I want restitution”—that
underpins the Hunger Games and may inform the UPR. This is a critical legal
roundabout that we might be able to end by, so the suggestion runs here, shooting
the enemy within (the Americans? the Europeans? the West? the powers that be?
ourselves?), thereby enabling resurrection as much as insurrection. For that is precisely
what Katniss’s act does here: in killing Coin, paradoxically, she calls herself back
from the dead of subjective destitution. And not just herself, but Peeta too, himself

101. Id. at 10 (“Those over fourteen have been given entry-level ranks in the military and are
addressed respectfully as ‘Soldier.’”).
102. Id. at 404–06.
103. JACQUES LACAN AND THE OTHER SIDE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 292.
104. COLLINS, MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 434.
105. Id. at 430–33.
106. Id. at 433–34.
107. DYLAN EVANS, AN INTRODUCTORY DICTIONARY OF LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS
136–37 (1996) (defining the term as a French psychiatric term with legal consequences, akin to the
common law’s insanity defence and absolving perpetrators of criminal acts that are the direct result of
a psychotic episode).
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tortured, à la Agamben,108 into a sort of Musselman-like, even homo sacer kind of
living death, his mind filled with a paranoid-schizophrenic plague of fantasies.109
This recall to life, however, privatises her once again, disconnecting her
literally from Panem—still the centre of action under the new regime and of which
Gale Hawthorne, tellingly, is a key bureaucratic player, the reformed radical now
turned establishment figure; as well as detaching her, figuratively, from the symbolic
mandate as the leader of the “Mockingjay” movement and its revolt.110 To what
end, though, does this disconnection and detachment tend? Naturally, to heal; for
both Peeta and Katniss are victimised survivors, each dealing with respective
posttraumatic stress disorders.111 But more than that, to create a space, indeed a
place, to ponder their respective situations, to make sense of their past, and to
(re)create their future, and with it, the laws of each, especially in terms of rights. For
is there a right more sacred than the right to be left alone to reinvent the world—
both its cosmos and logos anew—without regard to immediate pay-off? Which might
be not only Collins’s but my own friendly and collegial riposte to a scholar whom I
very much respect and admire, Hilary Charlesworth: that instead of less “ritual” and
more reality, rights on the contrary need more “ritual” and less reality. But, perhaps
I debate with a straw(wo)man here because—when all is said and done—this is the
position, fundamentally, of Hilary Charlesworth herself. For her real objection, with
respect to rights, is to an empty “ritualism” of rights rather “ritual” per se; indeed,
rituals, according to Charlesworth, are as necessary as they are desirable, ensuring
that right-ful process is observed, regardless of policy outcomes, bottom lines, and/
or key performance indicators.112 Far then from condemning the UPR, or other
rights-sensitive agents, to some Sisyphean task of never-ending inefficacy, such an
adherence to the rites of rights would, in the end, liberate jurists to rethink a spiel, a
game, a rule system: in short, a law in which “the odds,” as the irrepressible Effie
Trinket herself might put it, are most definitely in everyone’s “favour.”113

108. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE
(Werner Hamacher & David E. Wellbery ed., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
109. COLLINS, MOCKINGJAY, supra note 4, at 209–10.
110. Id. at 12, 448.
111. See, e.g., id. at 446 (describing Katniss’s dream where she is at the bottom of a grave and
sees every dead person she knows).
112. Charlesworth, 2012 Lecture, supra note 2.
113. COLLINS, HUNGER GAMES, supra note 4, at 23.

